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Reason and Revelation in Hooker
Reason and Revelation
in
Richard Hooker's
Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie
Towards a Public Scriptural Hermeneutic
by
Terry Miller
To be sure, the Bible has been and is for the Christian Church the
primary source of its teaching and the chief rule of guidance for
its religious life. Those ordained to the Episcopal orders are
required to take an oath that they "believe the Holy Scriptures of
the Old and New Testament to be the Word of God, and to contain all
things necessary to salvation." The Chicago-Lambeth Quadrilateral
holds the primacy of Scripture to be one of the four distinguishing
fundamentals of Anglicanism.(1)
Articles VI and XVIII of The Thirty-Nine Articles of Religion make
mention of the role or authority of Scripture. Yet according to Paul
Tillich, "Probably nothing has contributed more to the
misinterpretation of the biblical doctrine of the Word than the
identification of the Word with the Bible."(2)
Today within our church we see expressed the entire range of
possibilities in interpretation and exegesis of the Scriptures,
including literalist, pietist, historical-critical, feminist, and
liberationist. Each group claims a particular understanding of the
Bible, and asserts its authority as interpreters of the Word of God,
to the exclusion of other approaches. It would appear that the
Scriptures divide our church as often as unite it. The challenge of
determining how to interpret Scripture is further complicated in the
Anglican Church on account of the fact that Scripture is frequently
seen as one authority among several. Indeed, it is commonplace in
Anglican self-understanding to refer to the triple authority of
"Scripture, reason and tradition."(3)
However, despite the near ubiquity of this notion of
triple-authority,(4)
there has been no single definitive Anglican account of how these
principles are related to each other,(5)
leaving the suggestion that they to be considered somewhat
independently and perhaps on equal footing. For at least one hundred
years, Richard Hooker (1553-1600) has been identified as a principal
and original source of this notion of triple authority.(6)
The purpose of this paper is to consider Hooker's understanding of
the interrelationship of the first two elements of this triad,(7)
Scripture and reason, in the hope that we might discern how Hooker
understood the authority and role of Scripture.
The Estimation of Scripture in the
Lawes
Reading through the Lawes, one is quickly made aware of the
fact that Richard Hooker revered Holy Scripture.(8)
Hooker never undervalued the Bible. In the Preface, he refers to the
Bible as "that most blessed fountaine, the booke of life."(9)
He speaks firmly and eloquently, describing the great wealth of
Scripture as "the oracles of God," the provider of that which we
need.(10)
In Ch 21 of Book V of the Laws Hooker wrote: "we are to knowe that
the word of God is his heavenlie truth touchinge matters of eternal
life revealed and uttered unto men....We therefore have no word of
God but the Scripture."(11)
Indeed, the Scripture has a special and honored place for Hooker.(12)
It was his primary text consistently throughout the Lawes.
Haugaard notes that in Books II-IV, more than half (242) of his 431
explicit references are to the Holy Scriptures, and that almost
three-quarters of these references are introduced into his
discussion with his theological opponents.(13)
What is more, says Hooker, the kind of truth that has been revealed
in Scripture possesses a unique advantage, for it is
incontrovertible.(14)
Puritan Opponents and their Position
Yet, despite the reverence in which Hooker held Scripture and the
place of authority he attributed to it, Hooker found himself at odds
with English churchmen who sought to reform the polity of Church of
England according to a scriptural discipline. For Hooker, their
assertion of the Reformation doctrine of sola Scriptura
exceeded its proper boundaries. Hooker identified(15)
the Puritan error, the "very maine pillar" of the cause,(16)
in their assertion "that the Scripture of God is in such sort the
rule of humaine actions, that simply whatsoever we doe, and are not
by it directed thereunto, the same is sinne."(17)
Again, Hooker wrote: "whereas God hath left sundry kindes of lawes
unto men, and by all those lawes the actions of men are in some sort
directed: they hold that one onely lawe, the scripture, must be the
rule to direct in all thinges, ever so farre as the taking up of a
rush or strawe."(18)
What the Puritans, according to Hooker, appear to be asserting is an
"omnicompetence" of Scripture, that is, that Scripture, apart from
any other authority, is sufficient and competent to determine every
facet of the Christian's personal and corporate life. What is
assumed by the Puritan claim to the omnicompetence of Scripture is
that the goodness of God is something that can be communicated into
a written form that codifies that righteousness for human behavior.
As Hooker recognized, if all of God's goodness is communicate in
Scripture, the overwhelming problems of interpretation and making
daily decisions consistent with that revelation necessarily cause
consciences to rely on themselves. Life would consist of a constant
inwardness as one attempts to align oneself with a particular
interpretation of Scripture.(19)
What the Puritans were in fact doing by their hermeneutic was
claiming certainty in matters of God's will through their doctrines
concerning inspiration and the human conscience.(20)
Their conception is summarized in the following way. The first point
is that Scripture, which undoubtedly consists of human words, has
its authority on the basis of these words being inspired by God. On
this point, all the major protagonists of Elizabethan England would
agree. The problem occurs in the second part of the Puritan
hermeneutic, which is, namely, that the same Spirit that gives
authority to these words also enables the spiritual person to
interpret Scripture properly.(21)
Thus, in the Puritan hermeneutic, whether others can be persuaded by
a particular interpretation of Scripture does not matter since the
authority of the Spirit is immanently located in the holiness of the
spiritual person. It is a matter, he says, of the "force of their
owne discretion."(22)
This appeal to individual conscience strikes one as troublesome and
inappropriate given the Puritan doctrine of the total depravity of
human nature, the very doctrine that made them distrust the use of
reason in the interpretation of Scripture.(23)
On the surface, it appears that the Puritan concern here is to
affirm our total dependency on God for the correct interpretation of
Scripture.(24)
However, Hooker is convinced that what is affirmed on the surface is
denied in fact. By removing faith from rational, public
deliberation, the Puritans, Hooker alleged, became unwitting slaves
to their private fancies and prejudices.(25)
Thus, in frustration, Hooker observes that this view causes a
judgment where "reason were an enimie unto religion [and] childish
simplicitie the mother of ghostlie and divine wisedom."(26)
Elsewhere, Hooker attacks the unexamined Biblicism of the would-be
reformers of the Church of England by examining its unspoken
assumptions. That no authority had ever any right to contradict
Scripture was such an obvious Protestant insight of his own day that
Hooker does not even try to defend it. He simply assumes it,
focusing his attention instead on the principle that every
authoritative demand must be rational. He denounces as "brutish" any
attempt to secure loyalty on the basis of naked appeals to the
inspiration of human authorities, declaring "that authority of men
should prevaile with men either against or above reason, is no part
of our belief."(27)
Hooker suggests that the exclusive appeal to Scripture to resolve
moral quandaries can in fact legitimate the private judgments of
individuals who twist the Bible to support their questionable views.
In the Preface, Hooker already calls attention to the way a "misfashioned
preconceipt" can color one's perception of the biblical message.(28)
In Book III, he points to a specific exegetical practice which will
yield conclusions already formulated in an a priori fashion. His
opponents, he says, commonly "quote by-speeches in some historicall
narration or other" as law. By so doing, they "adde to the lawe of
God," a damning charge considering the principle sola Scriptura
at the center of Protestant confession. Hooker harshly condemns
those who "shall presume thus to use the scripture."(29)
Hooker identifies a further, and more critical danger of the Puritan
hermeneutic. He worries if the Puritan approach to Scripture will
not inevitably lead to sectarian and indeed schismatic exclusivism.
In the Preface his description of Anabaptism is designed to warn his
readers concerning the descent into fanaticism which results once
persons "imagine that Scripture every where favoureth that
discipline" designed to cure the alleged evils of society.(30)
This inevitably results in the withdrawal of spiritual groups from
society under the special illumination of the Spirit since Scripture
concurred with what was already held to be true, and called for
general conformity to this view. In Hooker's mind, the idea of a
group enjoying 'special illumination' and withdrawing from all
contaminating influences is inextricably bound up with this mode of
moral reasoning.(31)
Hooker was therefore concerned by the elitist results of Puritan
conviction, and by the church fragmenting on the basis of moral
discrimination around a predefined understanding of Scripture.(32)
Scripture in a World of Laws
For Hooker, the Puritans gave too much ground in their hermeneutic
to an individual's own subjective beliefs, which would, he believed,
lead to numerous social problems, such as elitism and sectarianism.
Since Hooker was faced with the same dilemma he put to the Puritans,
that is, asserting a biblical hermeneutic free of "preconceipt," it
remains to examine what approach he used to resolve it. Many authors
have drawn attention to Hooker's emphasis on reason and the
interpretative outcome of "probable" results, which is to offer
conclusions based on consensus that are also amenable to discussion.(33)
The "probable" here does not, however, refer to an unrestricted
pragmatism that offers only private conviction, but to one that by
definition secures the resources of heaven by virtue of the primary
authority of the Scriptures and its aptness for communal
interpretation. In response to what he saw as the subjectivity of
the Puritan interpretation of Scripture, Hooker looked for open and
public interpretation of Scripture, as well as for debate about
ecclesiastical and social polity. He fortified his claim by
appealing to judicious learning publicly deployed, and by a general
consensus in the church present and past. In the Preface, he sought
an open-minded hearing from his Puritan opponents as he deployed his
arguments.(34)
Though this might be dismissed as mere rhetoric, Hooker's repeated
reference to the ideal of "judicious learning' and his preference
for a "more judicious exposition" of Scripture reflect more than a
merely polemical tactic.(35)
The superiority of public deliberation, and the communal nature of
faith in general, in fact underlies and directs the whole of his
theological argument. Indeed, the desire to place the debate in the
public arena naturally leads to developing his discussion of "lawes
eternal" and of the relationship between reason and Scripture.
Hooker sought to establish the grounds and framework for public
deliberation by placing it in as wide a context as possible. While
affirming Scriptures' indispensability for salvation, Hooker did not
regard them as the only means by which God communicates with humans.
In Book I of the Lawes, Hooker locates divine revelation
through Scripture within the general capacity of humans to know
anything, including the "certaine boundes and limits"(36)
of knowledge which are conditioned by the reality of the created
order itself. Within such an order, knowledge is appropriated in
varying ways, and humans vary in their capacity to know. Hooker
speaks of three ways of knowing God's will that it may be done:
sense, reason, and revelation "which doth open those hidden
mysteries that reason could never have beene able to finde out, or
to have knowne the necessitie of them unto our everlasting good."(37)
These ways of knowing, Hooker suggests, correspond to the structure
of the universe. Hooker argues that the universe is ordered
according to 'laws,' or eternal principles, through which God
governs, upholds, and directs all of Creation.(38)
He identifies first God's secret eternal law, from which all other
categories or classifications of law are derived, including the law
of nature, the law of angels, the law of reason, the scriptural law
or divine law, and human law. Scripture, or scriptural law, is,
then, one sort of law, one way of knowing God's will. The other way
by which humans know God's will is in natural law, which humans
perceive through reason. The powers of deductive reasoning are
therefore not to be thought absolutely corrupt (as Calvinist would
have it) but open to divine appeal, since if this were not so, "eyther
all flesh is excluded from possibilitie of salvation, which to
thinke were most barbarous, or else that God hath by suernaturall
meanes revealed the way of life so far forth doth suffice.(39)
With such a structure, Hooker can thus say that we "have no word of
God but the Scripture"(40)
while at the same time insisting that God, through laws other than
the supernatural, guides and directs the creation to the fulfillment
of the divine will.
Before discussing the nature of scriptural law, Hooker first
explains why it is necessary. When Hooker develops his understanding
of the basis of human society, he speaks of the desire of all men to
be happy.(41)
And in pursuit of happiness, humanity seeks a physical perfection,
an intellectual perfection, and also a spiritual and divine
perfection.(42)
This last perfection can only come by divine reward, which humanity
cannot naturally attain and apart from which we are lost.(43)
Yet none of our works can be pure enough to merit such a reward of
spiritual perfection-hence the need for divine revelation. Through
Scripture, God reveals the supernatural way of salvation,(44)
a way which begins with his compassion for the lost condition of
humanity and then redemption through Christ's death.(45)
Owing to humanity's willful rejection of the order of creation, the
natural law by itself is insufficient to secure the unity of the
cosmos under God. With a marked Augustinian emphasis, Hooker notes
that fallen humanity continues to possess a natural desire to be
happy,(46)
and thus to be reunited with the eternal source of order; yet, on
account of original sin, man is "inwardly obstinate, rebellious and
averse from all obedience unto the sacred lawes of his nature."(47)
Thus, observance of the natural law is not (or, at least, is no
longer) effectual in preserving the divinely constituted order
within humans.(48)
According to Hooker, this predicament has as much to do with the
'nature' of natural law as it does with sin.(49)
Nevertheless, reason cannot escape the predicament of desiring both
a participation of the divine nature while, at the same time, being
constitutionally incapable of finding its way to the consummation of
its own deepest longing.(50)
While nature demands a "more divine perfection,"(51)
the means whereby this perfection is attained cannot themselves be
natural. Hence, the need for supernatural revelation in Scripture.
Scriptures in Relation to Reason
While acknowledging the necessity of Scripture to guide us as to
God's will beyond what reason can determine and unto salvation,
Hooker at the same time emphasizes continuity between that ideal law
of nature and of reason, and those positive laws which are revealed
in Scripture. According to Hooker, Scripture and reason are not in
conflict, since both have their source in God(52)
as two ways by which the "spirit leadeth men into all truth." Reason
is offered universally to the human race, revelation to "some few,"
but the basic principle of reasonable behavior is the same in both.(53)
Here we see a distinction between Hooker and his Calvinist
opponents. According to Hooker, the human mind, in spite of its
infection by sin, retained the capacity to perceive divine
intentions for the world and for humankind as well as the ability to
perceive truth in the special revelations.(54)
Men and women could direct their lives in right ways by combined use
of their natural capacities and grace. Consequently, humans are not
to despise the God-given law of nature, "imprinted in the mindes of
all the children of men," which gives both general principles and
guidance for "the choise of good and evill in the daylie affaires of
this life."(55)
For his opponents, adhering to a belief in total depravity, Hooker's
affirmation of the validity of natural reason for moral decisions
was a denial of the Protestant doctrine of salvation by grace
through faith and evidence of Hooker's lapse into Papism. Hooker
did, however, affirm salvation by grace,(56)
but he was not as willing to throw out nature for it. The created
order, coming from the hand of God, was not at variance with divine
purpose and love. The corruptions of human mind were not complete,
and thus the Scriptures themselves presupposed the human capacity to
reason and debate as good in itself, and not fatal to faith or
obedience.(57)
Indeed, Hooker strongly implies that refusing the gift of reason
constitutes an act of "presumptuous boldnes"(58)
bordering on blasphemy against the generous Creator.(59)
This thesis that reason is consonant with Scripture, not destroyed
by it, appears throughout Hooker's writings. "The evidence of Gods
owne testimonie added unto the naturall assent of reason" confirms
that assent with regard to the many laws of nature included in
Scripture.(60)
The systematic consonance of Scripture and reason, grace and nature,
is apparent throughout Hooker's works and connects him to Thomas
Aquinas and to the great medieval tradition.(61)
But Hooker shares much more with Aquinas than this conviction of the
consonance between reason and revelation. For Hooker, as for
Aquinas,(62)
grace does not destroy but perfects nature, and Scripture does not
obliterate but perfects reason.(63)
Scripture makes all truths more apparent, even those that may be
derived independently by reason of nature. To put it another way,
Scripture aids the frailty of human reason even in those things that
reason can attain to.(64)
Scriptural law builds upon natural law, which to Hooker is likewise
essential,(65)
perfecting the human "light of natural understanding."(66)
Thus, against the Puritans' denial of the authority of reason,
Hooker affirms that reason, within proper limits, is not destroyed
but is in fact perfected by being recognized in Scripture.(67)
As Hooker holds that Scripture presupposes and builds upon reason,
it comes as no surprise, then, that he believes reason must also
shape our encounter with Scripture. The point of departure is the
common ground shared by all Christians that "we all beleeve that the
Scriptures are sacred, and that they proceeded from God,"(68)
a belief Hooker himself shares. Yet, he recognizes that such a
belief rests on an assumption that has so far not been examined.
Scripture presupposes the operation of human reason and authority
for its credibility and interpretation.(69)
First, regarding credibility, Hooker recognizes that, prior to
interpreting Scripture, we must possess knowledge of certain
principles, especially the principle of the authority of Scripture.
We must be convicted of the sacred authority of Scripture, which
Scripture itself cannot teach.(70)
We must be persuaded by other means (namely, by church authority
and/or by experience(71))
that Scriptures are the oracles of God.(72)
Second, even when the authority of God's Word is confirmed, any
actual use of Scripture requires exercising reason in hermeneutical
discernment, for "betweene true and false construction, the
difference reason must shew."(73)
Reason is necessarily active in the interpretation of Scripture,
both for the elusiveness of some necessary truths from rational
inquiry and for many deep and profound points of doctrine not
explicit in the Scriptures. Hooker specifically designates belief in
the Trinity, the coeternity of the Son with the Father, the
procession of the Holy Spirit, and the baptizing of infants, which
are "in scripture no where to be found by express literall mention,"
but "only deduced they are out of scripture by collection," that is,
by "reasoning" or "logical inference."(74)
This "collection" from Scripture limits what is necessary, not what
may be conjectured or surmised.(75)
Related to this thesis that Scripture presupposes and builds upon
reason is Hooker's view that human reason (at least within the
church(76))
stands above Scripture to criticize it and to qualify laws given in
it. While many Reformers had treated parts of the Hebrew law as
abrogated by Christ (for example, that Christ abrogated the
ceremonial law), Hooker went beyond and asserted that, because of
the relationship of Scripture and reason, some positive laws of God
which were not explicitly abrogated by Christ are nevertheless
mutable in the light of reason. In Book III, Hooker describes
certain (positive) divine laws, such as the ceremonial law, as
mutable because the end for which they were created had been
fulfilled,(77)
but also allows for revision in cases where, even though the end of
the law is permanent, the law must be altered, e.g. the judicial law
of theft.(78)
In both cases, the alteration of divine law is not only allowable
but required and is accomplished by rational means.(79)
Teleology within History
By stating that some scriptural laws are open to revision, Hooker
implicitly recognizes that some laws are mutable while others are
eternal and unchanging. The principle with which Hooker
discriminates between the two sorts has been described by William
Haugaard as a process marked by "historical contextualization and
teleology."(80)
According to this interpretive model, Hooker sought to exegete
Scripture according to "that end wherto it tendeth"(81)
in light of the historical context (or, more accurately, in the
context of biblical salvation-narrative) in which the text is
located. Hooker draws on his Aristotelian Thomism(82)
to insist that "the words of [God's] mouth are absolute...for
performance of that thing whereunto they tend."(83)
Philosophical and metaphysical teleology becomes a tool in
understanding the scriptural text both in its original context and
in its application to his own age. According to this hermeneutic,
the purposes of divine as well as human words provide a key to
interpreting texts, and their purposes are only accurately
determined by taking account those changes in human society which
were, for Hooker, a given of God's creation.(84)
Thus, while Hooker regards all scriptural laws to be from God's by
direct revelation,(85)
the conditions under which they operate and the purpose for which
God introduces them are subject to the same considerations and
limitations as natural laws derived through the processes of reason
and positive laws determined by human decree or legislation.(86)
For this reason, modern exegetes have long appreciated his concern
to distinguish passages that reflect the unchanging principal
purpose of Scripture from those reflecting other concerns.(87)
It was the hermeneutical combination of teleology and historical
contextualization that enabled Hooker to make such an analysis.
Hooker describes the purpose of Scripture in a number of different,
though complementary, ways, all of which indicate that the purpose
of Scripture is to grant knowledge of saving truth.(88)
As this knowledge is conveyed in the form of a narrative, the
salvation story as a whole then becomes for Hooker an interpretive
schema by which he interprets biblical texts for his context in
sixteenth-century England.(89)
And as Jesus Christ is the focus of the salvific meta-narrative, it
is only natural, then, that the Incarnation is a central and
controlling element in Hooker's hermeneutic.(90)
It affects the way in which he understands the authority of
Scripture, history and church life.(91)
The Incarnation is the foundational point of the divine revelation,
and it therefore provides the authority by which all other
revelatory authorities are to be judged. Thus Scripture's authority
is contingent upon the authority of the greater revelation in the
Incarnation of the Son of God in Christ. It is the Scripture's
witness to that revelation which gives it authority.(92)
The Scriptures have, then, a demarcated authority in terms of
purpose, namely to offer salvation: "The ende of the word of God is
to save, and therefore we terme it the word of life."(93)
Elsewhere, Hooker speaks of "that eternal veritie which hath
discovered the treasures of hidden wisedome in Christ."(94)
Hooker's attention is thus fixed on the end and purpose of
Scripture, on that which is witnessed to rather than on the witness.
It is from this Christocentric perspective, also, that Hooker is
able to affirm the continuity between the Old and New Testaments.(95)
Having determined the purpose for which Scripture is intended,
Hooker can discriminate between things within Scripture which are
foundational and peripheral. Though it is clear that Hooker sees
reason and natural laws, which are intermingled with supernatural
laws in Scripture, as important means by which to distinguish those
things which are essential from those that are not, it is also
important to Hooker that what is essential or central must refer
fundamentally to that which is "necessary for salvation." Hooker
distinguishes in the Lawes between "matters accessory," the
adiaphora, and "matters necessary."(96)
These "matters accessory"(97)
to those things that are necessary to salvation or civil order, as
Scripture and reason have defined them, include certain ceremonial
matters, such as the sign of the Cross at Baptism, which Hooker
explicitly called "matters indifferent."(98)
The category of "the indifferent," for Hooker, referred to matters
in-between the required and prohibited, matters which could thus be
left to the church to regulate.(99)
Being "indifferent" did not, however, mean that such matters were
unimportant or arbitrary. That this would be a misconstruction is
clear, when one considers those things which turn out to be
"indifferent" but ordained by the church, matters such as ceremonies
and church polity. For Hooker, these matters include almost
everything in debate between Hooker and the Puritans.(100)
Indeed, in the Preface and the following Books II-IV, the primary
thrust of Hooker's polemic is directed toward refuting the advanced
Puritan claims that there is one and only one platform of God in the
Bible; that such a polity is one of the essential "marks" of the
Church (along with the true preaching of the Word and the right
administration of the sacraments); and that having such a polity in
place is "necessary for salvation."(101)
Rather, Hooker assigns church polity here and elsewhere to the realm
of "things indifferent" (adiaphora) that can and must be
determined by "human law" insofar as the church is a "human" as well
as a "divine" society, and only after taking local and national
historical circumstances into account. Thus, it would seem that
"indifferent" is a category which does not refer to the nature of
the matter itself, as if it were arbitrary, but rather refers to the
degree to which Scriptural precept or precedence bears on the
matter.
Scripture and the Context of Community
The consideration of Hooker's hermeneutic, in general, points toward
another and vitally important perception governing his
theology-corporate context. For Hooker, reason presupposed not only
the individual knower, but also the community as the locus of
meaning and knowledge, experience and assent. The Christian knower
is in Christ and being in Christ is in the fellowship and communion
of Christ, the visible church where justification and sanctification
occur concretely in relation to the communal sacraments of baptism
and the Eucharist.(102)
For Hooker, the church is then necessarily the location for
authoritative interpretation of Scripture, and it is thus for three
reasons.(103)
First, because the church is a saved community, built upon the
Incarnation and the grace bestowed through that, it is a community
committed to the centrality of those things which are necessary for
salvation, and to the non-centrality of those things which are
secondary and not necessary. The second reason, related to the
first, is that, in the church, reason is redeemed and shown to be
consonant with revelation.(104)
Third, the church is important in terms of Hooker's concern of
consensus in doctrine.(105)
Hooker appeals to the Church Fathers as he appeals to the generality
of learned humanity,(106)
involving "the rule of common discretion,"(107)
the insights of wise men (whose wisdom is preferable to that of the
common lot of men),(108)
in accord with the wisdom of the ages, a consensus formed through
history,(109)
and the sentences of human authority in and through wise men, or the
"orders, laws, and constitutions in the church."(110)
However, because the Church Fathers in particular represent the
continuing perceptions of Christian people in light of the salvation
which they have and continue to experience because of their
knowledge of God through Jesus Christ in the Incarnation, that
particular consensus has special value for Hooker. In this context,
therefore, the interpretation of Scripture should take place within
the framework of the community of the church. True, of course, there
is reference to natural reason available to people at large, but the
interpretation of Scripture occurs in the church and in the light of
the church's tradition.(111)
Hooker summarizes:
"Be it in matter of the one kind or another, what
Scripture doth plainly deliver, to that the first place of both
credit and obedience is due; the next whereunto is whatsoever
any man can necessarily conclude by force of reason; after these
the voice of the Church succeedeth. That which the Church by her
ecclesiastical authority shall probably think and define to be
true or good, must in congruity of reason overrule all other
inferior judgments whatsoever."(112)
There is further meaning to Hooker's locating the use
of Scripture within the church.(113)
Whereas the Puritan tendency was to regard Scripture as confronting
the individual sinner, instructing, correcting, edifying the
individual, Hooker regards Scripture as the church's treasure,
properly regarded in the context of corporate worship:
For with us the readinge of scripture in the
Church is parte of our Church litourgie, a speciall portion of
the service which we doe to God, and not an exercise to spend
the time, when one doth waite for an others comminge, till
thassemblie of them that shall afterwardes worship him be
complete. Wherefore as the forme of our publique service is not
voluntarie, so neither are the partes thereof left uncertaine,
but they are all set downe in such order, and with such choice,
as hath in the wisdome of the Church seemed best to concurre as
well with the speciall occasions as with the generall purpose
which we have to glorifie God.(114)
The really noteworthy part of this quotation, as John
Barton and John Halliburton point out,(115)
is the statement that in the context of liturgy, the reading of
Scripture in the church is "a speciall portion of the service which
we doe to God." That is to say, the salvific story of God's acts in
history is remembered in the context of liturgy. This involves an
understanding of Scripture contrary to that of the Puritans, and,
one might add, contrary to the understanding prevalent among
biblical literalists today. Hooker understood the reading of
Scripture in terms of "worship" and "proclamation," more than
"edification" and "correction."
Conclusion
As has been argued, Hooker's intention from the beginning was to
defend the necessarily public nature of scriptural interpretation
and Christian faith as a whole, against Puritan reformers who
advocated what Hooker understood to be the authority of private
conscience and individual discretion. Towards this end, he sought to
uncover the assumptions and presuppositions undergirding his
opponents' position and to demonstrate the self-deception inherent
in their fideist assertion of sola Scriptura, in particular its
vulnerability to prejudice and subjectivity. At the same time,
Hooker sought to articulate his own hermeneutic, including the
philosophical and theological presuppositions underlying it (as best
he could identify). By expositing his theological method, Hooker
exposes his theology and himself to public scrutiny, which he
willingly accepted in order to provoke open, judicious deliberation
which would, exercising right reason, produce a reasonable
consensus. Consensus of the wise and godly throughout the ages
regarding God's will as seen through reason and Scripture is, he
felt, as sure an authority as we might ever find. But, his appeal to
consensus does not in itself ensure that those who make use of it
have done well.(116)
Rather, it invites further discussion and nurtures a climate of
deliberation with seriousness and diligence. This is the kind of
theological stance which Hooker thought best for anyone genuinely
interested in truth, and he proposed it as a means of furthering
theological thinking in his own generation.
Recognition of the relationship between Scripture and reason which
Hooker identified preserves an important principle for an important
priority of Scripture, as that to whose plain deliverances "the
first place both of credit and obedience is due,"(117)
without making the priority absolute. This relationship was
fundamental for his criticism of the Puritan position on polity and
may also be a permanent contribution to Anglican self-understanding,
which still revolves around the terms Scripture and reason. Indeed,
those who would follow Hooker in affirming reason as a means to
discover spiritual truth, should first consider the primacy Hooker
placed on Scripture in his theology. Such would-be claimants of
Hooker's legacy should furthermore consider how Hooker understood
the term 'reason.'(118)
Hooker's theology has no place for individualistic, rationalistic
conceptions of reason. For Hooker, reason directs and legitimates
not individual discretion, but public truth. Consequently, those in
the church that look to Hooker for support in affirming reason as a
source of knowledge appropriate for theological discourse cannot, if
faithful to Hooker, use 'reason' as justification for the facile
toleration of divergent theology and "difference" within the church.
Even less can they argue from Hooker and reason to ecclesial
'self-determination.'(119)
Indeed, underlying the whole of the Lawes is an argument
against private conscience as an inviolable authority, and an
argument for public deliberation and consensus.(120)
It would not only be a shame but also grave infidelity on the part
of those who claim theological descent from Hooker to overlook his
impassioned plea for public, 'judicious' discourse. Admonished by
Hooker's example, and recognizing the inescapably social nature of
questions facing the Anglican Communion presently, Anglicans and
Episcopalians are challenged to engage in the difficult human labor
of dialogue, with Scripture and with one another, in search of
communal consensus, which alone can offer a reliable enough basis
for action on behalf of the common good.
Endnotes
1. Book of Common Prayer (1979), pp, 876 77.
2. Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology (University of
Chicago Press: Chicago, 1951 63), Part I, p. 158.
3. Or, alternatively, "Scripture, tradition, and reason." To
name but a few examples, the authority triad is taken as normative
for Anglicans in Scripture, Tradition and Reason: a Study of the
Criteria of Christian Doctrine, ed. R. Bauckham and B. Drewery
(Edinburgh, T & T Clark., 1988); The Study of Anglicanism,
ed. Sykes, Booty, and Knight (SPCK: London, 1988), where the third
section is entitled "Authority and Method" includes chapters on each
of the three; Anglicanism and the Bible, ed. F. Borsch
(Morehouse Barlow: Wilton, CT, 1984); and more recently the
Windsor Report (2004, sections 53, 135), where the triad is
identified with almost no explanation.
4. Identified as the "three legged stool" or "three fold
cord" in most books introducing the Episcopal Church for the past
fifty years or so.
5. See (and note the order in this title) Scripture,
Tradition and Reason: a Study of the Criteria of Christian Doctrine,
in which "what is at stake throughout the volume is the one problem
of the relationship between the three" (p. vii). See also in
Christopher R. Seitz' "Repugnance and the Three Legged Stool," in
Reclaiming Faith: Essays on Orthodoxy in the Episcopal Church and
the Baltimore Declaration, ed. E. Radner and G. Sumner (Eeerdmans:
Grand Rapids, Mich., 1993), p88 93, and especially citations 3 4.
6. Again, to let a few stand for many, the following authors
might be noted: Francis Paget, Introduction to the Fifth Book
(Oxford, 1899), 226; Horton Davies, Worship and Theology in
England from Cranmer to Hooker, 1534 1603 (Princeton: Princeton
Univ. Press, 1970), xv; HR McAdoo, The Spirit of Anglicanism
(London: A and C Black, 1965), 152); and Scripture, Tradition,
and Reason, ed. Bauckham and Drewery, 35.
7. For consideration of views that Hooker offers an
inconsistent or inappropriate account of the relationship between
reason and Scripture, see Peter Munz, The Place of Hooker in the
History of Thought (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952),
61 62; Gunnar Hillerdal, Reason and Revelation in Richard Hooker
(Lund: CWK Gleerup, 1962), 148 50. See also Egil Grislis, "Hooker's
Image of Man," in Renaissance Papers 1963 (Durham, NC:
Southeastern Renaissance Conference, 1964), 82 83 and W. David
Neelands, The Theology of Grace of Richard Hooker (Th.D. diss.,
Trinity College. Toronto, 1988), 120 33.
8. See William P. Haugaard, "The Scriptural Hermeneutic of
Richard Hooker", in This Sacred History, ed. D. Armentrout
(Cowley: Cambridge, Mass., 1990), 166. Haugaard notes:
Hooker never undervalued the Bible; it was
consistently his primary text throughout the Lawes. In
Books II to IV, more than half (245) of his explicit references
(431) are to Scripture, and Hooker introduced almost
three quarters of these into the discussion with his theological
opponents. His concern to set proper limits to scriptural
authority was not intended to detract from the Bible, but, on
the contrary, to establish its credibility: "We must...take
great heede, last in attributing unto scripture more than it can
have, the incredibillitie of that do cause even those things
which indeed hath most aboundantly to be lesse reverendly
esteemed. (11.8.7; 191, 23 192 1).
9. Hooker, Of The Lawes of Ecclesiastical Polity,
Preface, 2.1; 1:3.18 19. Citations refer to The Folger Library
Edition of the Works of Hooker, ed. W. Speed Hill (Cambridge, Mass.,
1997) and follow the pattern of book and section, followed by volume
of FLE volume, page, and line number.
10. Lawes, I.14.1; 1.126.11.
11. V.21.2; 2:84.13 18.
12.
By scripture it hath in the wisedom of God seemed
meete to deliver unto the world much but personally expedient to
be practised of certaine men; many deepe and profound pointes of
doctrine, as being the maine originall ground whereupon the
precepts of dutie depend; many prophecies the cleere performance
whereof might confirme the world in beliefe of things unseene;
many histories to serve as looking glasses to behold the mercie,
the truth, the righteousnes of God towards all that faithfullie
serve, obey and honor him; yea, many intire meditations of
pietie to be as paternes and presidents in cases of like nature;
many things needfull for explication, many for application unto
particular occasions, such as the providence of God from time to
time hath taken to have the severall bookes of his holie
ordinance written. (I.13.3; 1:123.24 124.8)
13. William Haugaard, "The Scriptural Hermeneutics of Richard
Hooker," p. 166.
14. "That for which we have probable, yea, that which we have
necessary reason for, yea, that which we see with our eies, is not
thought so sure as that which the scripture of God teacheth; because
wee hold that his speech revealeth there what himselfe seeth. And
therefore the strongest proofe of all, and the most necessaryly
assented unto by us (which do thus receive the scripture) is the
scripture." (II.7.5; 1:179.19 25)
15. How accurate was Hooker's estimation of the Puritan
position? John Coolidge (The Pauline Renaissance in England,
Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1970) has pointed out that Hooker and
Cartwright were not in as sharp disagreement on Scripture and reason
as was supposed and that Cartwright's "straw" statement must be seen
alongside his conviction that the authority of Scripture for most
ecclesiastical matters is found in four general rules enunciated by
Paul: that there be no offense given (1 Cor. 10:32), "that all be
done in order and comeliness (1 Cor. 14:40), that all be done to
deifying" (1 Cor. 14:26), and that all be done to the glory of God
(Rom. 14:6 7). It is in this sense that nothing should be done
without the express warrant of Scripture. Coolidge thus emphasizes a
larger degree of agreement among the combatants than Hooker would
allow, but he then acknowledges a basic difference. The Puritan
"insists on trying to hear God's voice of command in all his
thought," while Hooker and others of his mind seem convinced that
"in following the dictates of reason alone": they are "obeying some
part of God's law." William Haugaard (The Scriptural Hermeneutics
of Richard Hooker) discerns a further difference, this time not
only separating Hooker from Cartwright but from Whitgift as well.
This difference pertains to the way in which the Scripture is
perceived, all acknowledging the authority of Scripture, and yet
qualifying that authority. Cartwright and Whitgift qualify parts of
the Old Testament in the light of Jesus Christ, but otherwise take
the Scriptural texts at "face value as they applied them." Hooker
applies his teleological principle (Lawes I.14), insisting
that "the words of [God's] mouth are absolute... for performance of
that thing whereunto they tend." (Lawes II.6.1; 1:168.3 5)
Haugaard points out that, while Cartwright, Whitgift, and Hooker all
could agree that 'certain thinges' in church life might vary
according to 'time, places, persons, and other circumstances,' only
Hooker took this principle of historical relativity and applied it
not only to church life subsequent to the New Testament, but to the
exegesis of biblical passages themselves. (168)
Francis Paget (Introduction to the Fifth Book, Oxford, 1899)
helpfully distinguishes between Puritan and Hookerian
understandings. The Puritan principle tends toward a view of life
"as a flat surface all equally lit from one source of evidence, the
Scripture, which required always...one form of acknowledgement, and
absolute and settled assent." Hooker's understanding is more in
accord with the facts of life, as Paget sees them. For Hooker, there
are a multiplicity of evidences, great diversity, degrees of clarity
and obscurity, with corresponding degrees of assent, "varying
between certain conviction and suspense of judgement." Says Paget:
"The evidence of plain Scripture, the evidence of sense, the
evidence of invincible demonstration, the evidence of preponderating
probability, the evidence of human authority, all command their
corresponding measure of assent. And thus correspondent adaptation
of assent to evidence in each case is both a fact of experience ...
and also a religious duty."
The passages in Book II to which Paget refers require careful
attention. First: "the truth is, that how bold and confident soever
we may be in words, when it commeth to the point of tryall, such as
the evidence is which the truth hath eyther in it selfe or through
proofe, such is the hearts assent thereunto, neither can it be
stronger, being grounded as it should be." (II.7.5; 1:180.16 20)
Second: "in all things... are our consciences best resolved, and in
most agreeable sort unto God and nature settled, when they are so
farre perswaded as those grounds of perswasion which are to be had
will beare." (ibid.; 1:180.5 8) There is more of note here than
presently can be considered but the chief point at this juncture is
plain. Evidence and assent are various. The human quest for meaning
and thus for salvation is complex, although the foundation of the
faith appears to be simple and clear. This is so because God's
influence is "into the verie essence of all thinges, without which
influence of dietie supportinge them theire utter annihilation could
not choose but followe." (V.56.5; 2:236.22 25) God is the Creator
whose eternal law is the source from which all laws come, by which
all is governed in a rich, variegated, multifaceted world, perceived
by humans in various ways according to varying evidence, assented to
in various degrees. Hooker put it well in one of his most famous
statements:
Whatsoever either men on earth, or the Angels of
heaven do know, it is as a drop of that unemptiable fountaine of
wisdom, which wisdom hath diversly imparted her treasures unto
the world. As her waies are of sundry kinds, so her maner of
teaching is not meerely one and the same. Some things she
openeth by the sacred books of Scripture; some things by the
glorious works of nature: with some things she inspireth them
from above by spirituall influence, in some things she leadeth
and trayneth them onely by worldly experience and practise. We
may not so in any one speciall kind admire her that we disgrace
her in any other, but let all her wayes be according unto their
place and degree adored. (II.1.4; 1.147.23 148.6)
16. Pref. 7.3; 1:35.4 5
17. II.1.3; 1:146.25 27. "Compare An Admonition to the
Parliament" (Available in W. H. Frere and C.E. Doulass, Puritan
Manifestoes (SPCK: London, 1907; rpt. London, 1954): "that
nothing be done in this or any other thing, but that which you have
the expresse warrant of God's Worde for." (5 10)
18. II.1.2; 1:145.10 14.
19. "Admit this; and what shall scripture be but a snare and
a torment to weake consciences, filling them with infinite
perplexiies, scrupulosities, doubts insoluble, and extreme
despaires?" (II.8.6; 1:190.16 19) I cannot but recognize
similarities between the commonalities, in approach and in dangers,
between the hermeneutic of Hooker's Puritan opponents and that of
contemporary American Christian who claim to be Bible based yet do
not acknowledge, let alone articulate their own hermeneutic.
20. See Peter Munz, The Place of Hooker in the History of
Thought (Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd.: London, 1952)
21. This presents a 'hermeneutical circle' that functions
that individuals first look inward to judge their spiritual state
and then proceed claiming the authority of the Spirit in matters of
interpretation. Barry G. Rasmussen ("Trinitarian Hermeneutic of
Grace" in ATR LXXXIV:4, p932) calls attention Steven Ozment's claim
that such a hermeneutical circle is evident in Jean Gerson's
influential mystical hermeneutic of the early 15th century. The
result of this circle is that the spiritual person is given
authority in matters of scriptural interpretation. See Ozment,
Homo Spiritualis: A Comparative Study of the Anthropology of
Johannes Tauler, Jean Gerson, and Martin Luther (1509 1516) (EJ
Brill, Leiden, 1969)
22. Preface 3.1; 1:12.25
23. Munz, Place of Hooker, 32
24. The Puritans, as seen through Hooker, believed their
approach to Scripture to be in line with Calvin's. While they
recognized that reason had a legitimate function as a tool in the
processes of human thought, it was not a dependable source of
knowledge. They judged that, in Calvin's words, "the misshapen
ruins" of human reason, "choked with dense ignorance...cannot come
forth effectively." (John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian
Religion, trns. Henry Beveridge (Eerdmans: Grand Rapids, Mich.,
2001), II.2.12) Thus denying the utility of reason, they embraced
instead Calvin's hermeneutic of the Spirit which declares that the
testimony of the Spirit is superior to reason. For as God alone can
properly bear witness to his own words, so these words will not
obtain full credit in the hearts of men, until they are sealed by
the inward testimony of the Spirit. The same Spirit, therefore, who
spoke by the mouth of the prophets, must penetrate our hearts, in
order to convince us that they faithfully delivered the message with
which they were divinely entrusted." (Institutes, I.7.4)
So, there is a spiritual precondition necessary, in Calvin's view,
for the right reading of Scripture necessitated by the "foul
ungratefulness" of the human condition. (Institutes, I.5.4)
The reader of Scripture is then simply the humble beneficiary of the
ancient texts, such that when understanding fails, the text can
still be appropriated with the full assurance of faith. Those who
are inwardly taught by the Holy Spirit acquiesce implicitly in
Scripture; that Scripture carrying its own evidence along with it,
deigns not to submit to proofs and arguments, but owes the full
conviction with which we ought to receive it to the testimony of the
Spirit. Enlightened by him, we no longer believe, either on our own
judgement or that of others, that the Scriptures are from God; but,
in a way superior to human judgement, feel perfectly assured as
much so as if we beheld the divine image visibly impressed on
it that it came to us, by the instrumentality of men, from the very
mouth of God. We ask not for proofs or probabilities on which to
rest our judgement, but we subject our intellect and judgement to it
as too transcendent for us to estimate. This, however, we
do...because we have a thorough conviction that, in holding it, we
hold unassailable truth...more vividly and effectually than could be
done by human will or knowledge." (Institutes, I.7.5)
However, this interpretation of Calvin evidences a shallow reading
of the Institutes. For, the Genevan Reformer did in fact
affirm the existence of natural law, of which all humanity has
knowledge. On account of this, none have excuse before God:
The minds of all men have impressions of civil
order and honesty. Hence it is that every individual understands
how human societies must he regulated by laws, and also is able
to comprehend the principles of those laws. Hence the universal
agreement in regard to such subjects, both among nations and
individuals, the seeds of them being implanted in the breasts of
all without a teacher or lawgiver. (Institutes II.2.13)
If the Gentiles have the righteousness of the law naturally
engraven on their minds, we certainly cannot say that they are
altogether blind as to the rule of life. Nothing, indeed is more
common, than for man to be sufficiently instructed in a right
course of conduct by natural law, of which the Apostle here
speaks. Let us consider, however for what end this knowledge of
the law was given to men... The end of the natural law,
therefore, is to render man inexcusable, and may be not
improperly defined the judgment of conscience distinguishing
sufficiently between just and unjust. (Institutes
II.2.22)
Such knowledge he accepted as being imprinted on the
heart of everyone, which in some sense teaches us everything that is
necessary to know of God's will. Yet, because sin has obscured that
testimony, (Institutes II.8.1) we are unable by our powers
either to acquire or to reacquire and retain the knowledge of God's
natural law in its entirety and need a clearer and more reliable
revelation of the will of God for our lives, lest we wander off the
path of holiness and righteousness, God has revealed God's moral
law, supremely in the Decalogue. "Both for our dullness and our
contumacy, the Lord has given us his written Law, which, by its sure
attestations, removes the obscurity of the law of nature, and also,
by shaking off our lethargy, makes a more lively and permanent
impression on our minds." (Institutes II.8.1) For Calvin,
scriptural law reveals and clarifies natural law, that is, the law
that is known through reason. "The law of God which we call moral,
is nothing else than the testimony of natural law, and of that
conscience which God has engraven on the minds of men, the whole of
this equity of which we now speak is prescribed in it. Hence it
alone ought to be the aim, the rule, and the end of all laws." (Institutes
IV.20.16) Hooker acknowledges the Puritans' misconstruction of
Calvin when he cites the Reformer's view that the church has power
to make rules and regulations beyond Scriptural precept or precedent
for its own life. (Lawes III.11.13; 1:259)
25.
Most sure it is, that when mens affections doe
frame their opinions, they are in defense of error more earnest
a great deale, than (for the most part) sound believers in the
maintenance of truth apprehended according to the nature of that
evidence which scripture yeeldeth: which being in some things
plaine, as in the principles of Christian doctrine; in some
things, as in these matters of discipline, more darke and
doubtfull; frameth correspondentlie that inward assent which
Gods most gracious Spirit worketh by it as by his effectuall
instrument. It is not therefore the fervent earnestnes of their
perswasion, but the soundnes of those reasons whereupon the same
is built, which must declare their opinions in these things to
have been wrought by the holie Ghost, and not by the fraud of
that evill Spirit, which is even in his illusions strong. [2
Thess 2:11] After that the phancie of the common sort hath once
thoroughlie apprehended the Spirit to be author of their
perswasions concerning discipline; then is instilled into their
hearts, that the same Spirit leading men into this opinion doth
thereby seale them to be Gods children; and that, as the state
of the times now standeth, the most speciall token to know them
that are Gods owne from others, is an earnest affection that
waei. (Preface, 3.10: 1.17.29 18.4)
Whatsoever is spoken of God or thinges appertaining to God
otherwise then as truth is; though it seeme an honour, it is an
injurie. And as incredible praises geven unto men do often abate
and impaire the credit of their deserved commendation; so we
must likewise take great heede, lest in attributing unto
scripture more than it can have, the incredibillitie of that do
cause even those things which indeed hath most aboundantly to be
lesse reverendly esteemed. (II.8.7; 1:191.25 192.1)
26. III.8.4; 1:222.27 28
27. II.7.6; 1:181.13 15
28. Preface 3.9; 1:16.17 18
29. III.5.1; 1:215.10 12 and 18 19. It would be legitimate to
ask how Hooker's own use of Scripture can be free of an opposite but
just as problematic "preconceipt." Hooker is aware of the problem,
and declines to give absolute guarantees. As Egil Grislis describes
his position: "There is simply no theological method, however
correct, that can itself ensure its own infallibility." ("The
Hermeneutical Problem in Richard Hooker," in Studies in Richard
Hooker, ed. W. Speed Hill, Case Western Reserve University,
Cleveland, OH, 1972) 179. But Hooker believes our best hope lies in
consensus reached after broad dialogue. (More on this later) As he
put it, the way to "peace and quietnes" was to permit "the probable
voice of everie intier societie or bodie politique [to] overrule all
private of like nature in the same bodie" (Pref. 6.6; 1:34.6 9).
30. Pref. 3.16; 1:21.3 4
31. Pref. 3.16: 1:21.3 4.
32. Don. H. Compier, "Hooker on the Authority in Matters of
Morality," in Richard Hooker and the Construction of Christian
Community, (RHCCC) ed. Arthur S. McGrade, Medieval and
Renaissance Texts and Studies, No 165 (Tempe Ariz.: SUNY, 1997), 255
33. "Even Scripture itself is understood with the help of
reason and may be misunderstood or applied quite inappropriately
[II.7.9]...Hooker recognizes that a mere appeal be it to reason or
to Scripture does not automatically produce truth. There simply is
no theological method, however correct, that can itself ensure its
own infallibility. Even when the best method is most judiciously
employed, it yields, at the very best, only the highest probability
that can be humanly achieved and is never beyond further debate."
Egil Grislis, "The Hermeneutical Problem in Richard Hooker," p. 179.
34. Preface 1.3; 1:2.24 3.6
35. Egil Grislis ("The Hermeneutical Problem in Richard
Hooker," p. 173 76) calls attention to Hooker's use of "judicious"
as a superlative to refer to hard and diligent , oftentimes painful
and full of travail (Pref 1.3; 1:3.5 6 and 7.7; 1:36; also I.7.7;
1:81.10 12).
36. I.14.1; 1.125.18
37. I.15.4; 1:134.7, 12 14
38. To those of us accustomed to thinking about law as a
written rule, Hooker's definition of the term represents a
surprising expansion. He begins much in the manner of Aristotle and
Aquinas, dealing with though not analyzing the various kinds of
causes. Then he moves quickly to his first definition of law: "All
things that are have some operation not violent or casuall. Neither
doth any thing ever begin to exercise the same without some
forconceived ende for which it worketh. And the ende which it
worketh for is not obtained, unlesse the worke be also fit to
obteine it by. For unto every ende every operation will not serve.
That which doth assigne unto each ting the kinde, that which doith
moderate the force and power, that which doth appoint the forme and
measure of working, the same we tearme a Lawe" (I.2.1; 1:58.22 29).
Elsewhere he defines law, consistently to be sure, but more simply,
"any kind of rule or canon whereby actions are framed" (I.3.1;
1:63.13 14) or "a directive rule unto goodnes of operation" (I.8.4;
1:84.17).
Even God works in eternal decrees through some principle, Hooker
writes, though the divine law remains beyond our understanding. He
quotes pagan philosophers who saw the First Cause as acting in
accordance with Reason, "that is to say, constant order and law is
kept." (I.2.3; 1:60.13) As to God's purposes in His laws working,
Hooker writes, "God worketh nothing without cause. All those things
which are done by him, have some ende for which they are done: and
the ende for which they are done, it a reason of his will to do
them." (I.2.3; 1:60.20 23) Even though God's reasons and ends are
hidden, so central are reason and law from Hooker's standpoint that
they become a priori principles, matters of faith: "The particular
drift of everie acte proceeding externally from God, we are not able
to discerne, and therefore cannot always give the proper and
certaine reason of his works. Howbeit undoubtedly it be proper and
certaine reason there is of every finite worke of God, in as much as
there is a law imposed upon it." (I.2.4; 1:61.12 16) The rational
nature of God, for Hooker, is reflected in his created order.
From here, Hooker moves on to describe the various kinds of laws.
The law of God's own being and purposes Hooker terms the "first law
eternal." A "second law eternal" governs the wills, actions,
development, and alteration of all created beings: "that which with
himselfe he hath set downe as expedient to be kept by all his
creatures, according to the severall condition wherwith he hath
induced them." (I.3.1; 1:63.8 10) All other categories or
classifications of law are derived from this second law, including
the law of nature, the celestial law or law of angels, the law of
reason, the scriptural law, and human law, which he understood as
being "out of the law either of reason or of God, men probablie
gathering to be expedient, they make it law." (I.3.1; 1:63.24 26)
Scripture, then, has a place in this schema amidst the other types
of knowledge of God's will.
39. I.14.3; 1.127.21 26
40. V.21.2; 2:84.13 18
41. I.11.3; 1:112.21 113.15. See also David Neeland's article
"Scripture, Reason, and 'Tradition,'" RHCCC, p83 84
42. "Man doth seeke a triple perfection, first, a sensuall,
consisting in those things which very life it selfe requireth either
as necessary supplementes, or as beauties and ornaments therof; then
an intellectuall, consisting in those things which none underneth
man is either capable of or acquainted with; lastly a spirituall and
divine, consisting in those things wherunto we tend by supernatural
meanes here, but cannot here attain unto them." (I.11.4;
1:114.18 25)
43. I.11.5; 1:117 8
44. "God him self is the teacher of the truth, whereby is
made knowen the supernaturall way of salvation and law for them to
live in that shalbe saved." (I.11.5; 1:117.9 12)
45. "...redemption out of the same by the pretious death and
mert of a mightie Savior which hath witnessed of himself saying, I
am the way, the way that leadeth us from miserie into blisse. This
supernaturall way had God in himself prepared before all worldes.
The way of supernaturall dutie which to us he hath prescribed, our
Savior in the Gospell of saint John doth note, terming it by an
excellencie, the worke of God." (I.11.6; 1.118.20 26).
46. I.11.4; 1:114.8 10
47. I.10.1; 1:96.26 29
48. "The light of nature is never able to finde out any way
of obtayning the reward of blisse, but by performing exactly the
duties and workes of righteousnes. From salvation therefore and life
all flesh being excluded this way, behold how the wisedome of God
hath revealed a way mysticall and supernaturall ... concerning that
faith hope and charitie without which there can be no salvation; was
there ever any mention made saving only in that lawe which God him
selfe hath from heaven revealed?" (I.11.5, 6;
1:118.11 15,119.12 15). In this, Hooker is in agreement with the
Magisterial Reformers, particularly Calvin. See Institutes
II.8.1.
49. "What the Church of God standeth bound to knowe and doe,
the same in part nature teacheth. And because nature can teach them
but onely in part, neyther so fully, as is requisite for mans
salvation; nor so easily, as to make the way playne and expedite
enough, that many may come to the knowledge of it, and so be saved;
therefore in scripture hath God both collected the most necessarie
thinges, that the Schoole of nature teacheth unto that ende, and
revealeth also, whatsoever we neyther could with safetie be ignorant
of, nor at all be instructed in, but by supernaturall revelation
from him." (III.3.3; 1:210.20 29).
50. Human nature is so related to grace that, through desire,
it naturally identified as its end a state that was beyond nature
altogether and thus dependent on grace (Lawes I.11.2;
1:111.33 112.20. See also I.5.2; 1:73.5 10.). The classic discussion
of this predicament is Augustine's Confessions. See the
account of the "natural weight" of the soul in Book XIII.ix.
(Hackett, Indianapolis, 1993, p266).
51. See W. David Neelands, "Scripture, Reason and
'Tradition'," RHCCC, pp. 83 85.
52. Pref. 11.5
53. Pref. 3.10; 1:17.15 27
54. W. David Neelands ("Hooker on Scripture, Reason, and
Tradition," in RHCCC, p. 87) points to Hooker's use of the term
"aptness" to emphasize the capacity of humans to appropriate grace
and which could not be lost in the Fall since, "had aptness beene
also lost, it is not grace that could worke in us more than it doeth
in brute creatures." (IV.101.30 31)
55. II.8.6; 1:190.12 16
56. See Hooker's "A Learned Discourse of Justification," in
FLE, vol 5, especially p50 1, 105 6, 109, 112 3, 116, 312 13,
57. Hooker repeatedly reaches into the Bible itself to
illustrate the operation of reason as a natural God given human
faculty. He found "that there may be a certaine beliefe grounded
upon other assurance then Scripture" in the very challenge of Jesus
to believe because of his works and in Thomas' demand to see and
feel the nail prints in Jesus' flesh (John 10:38; 10:25; II.4.1;
1:152.5 12). Hooker points to the apostles' reasoning on the text of
the Psalms, to Paul and Barnabas' winning the unconverted through
reason, to Peter's arguing to the Council of Jerusalem in matters of
church policy, to the verse in 1 Peter that Christians ought render
a reason for their faith, and finally to "our Lord and Saviour him
selfe" reasoning in disputation with the crowd. (III.8.16 17;
1:233.10 15, 234.9 18, 18 25; 233.21 25; 234.2 7)
58. III.8.3; 1:221.16
59. Cf. III.8.9; 1:226.11 15. Hooker never appeals to reason
as the only authority for truth, he consistently preserves the
traditional two fold understanding of truth as both natural and
supernatural, and he does not prejudice which means God should
employ in disclosing a truth more wisely than to one individual
only. Truth may be obtained "either with miraculous operation, or
with strong and invincible remonstrance of sound Reason." (V.10.1)
Compare
There is in scripture therefore no defect, but
that any man what place or calling soever hee holde in the
Church of God, may have thereby the light of his naturall
understanding so perfected, that the one being relieved by the
other, there can be want no part of needful instruction unto any
good worke...It sufficeth therefore that nature and scripture
doe serve in such full sort, that they both jointly and not
severally eyther of them be so complete, that unto everlasting
felicitie wee need not the knowledge of any thing more than
these two, may easily furnish our mindes with on all sides, and
therefore they which adde traditions as part of supernaturall
necessarye truth, have not the truth, but are in error.
(I.14..5.129.3 16)
60. I.12.1; 1:120.13 15, and II.1.2; 1:145.24 29. See also
I.12 13; 1:119.26 124.26, and III.9.1 2; 1:236 237.29.
Particularly daring is Hooker's claim that Jesus' two precepts of
charity in the summary of the law as love of God and of neighbor as
self have been found out "by discourse" (i.e. by reason) like "other
mandates." Further, that all depends on these two laws is
corroborated by nature: "Wherefore the naturall measure wherby to
judge our doings, is the sentence of reason." (I.8.8; 1:88.28 89.1)
61. David Neelands, Scripture, Reason, and Tradition,
p. 79.
62. Summa Theologica I.1.8. Cf. ST II II.26.13
63. "Supernaturall endowments are an advancement, they are no
extinguishment of that nature whereto they are given." (Lawes
V.55.6; 2:2230.28 29)
64. See I.12.1 2; 1:119.26 121.29.
65. "It sufficieth therefore that nature and scripture doe
serve in such full sort, that they both jointly and not severallye
eyther of them be so complete, that unto everlasting felicitie wee
neede not the knowledge of any thing more than these two." (I.14.5;
1:129.10 13)
66. "There is in scripture therefore no defect, but that any
man what place or calling soever hee holde in the Church of God, may
have thereby the light of his naturall understanding so perfected,
that the one being relieved by the other, there can be want no part
of needful instruction unto any good worke which God himselfe
requireth." (I.14.5; 1:129.3 8)
67. II.7.2; 1:175.20 30.
68. II.4.2; 1:153.14 15.
69. "We have endeavored to make it appeare, how in the nature
of reason it selfe there is no impediment, but that the selfe same
spirit, which revealeth the things that god hath set down in his
law, may also be thought to aid and direct men in finding out by the
light of reason what lawes are expedient to be made for the guiding
of his Church, over and besides them that are in scripture."
(III.8.18; 1:235.6 11).
70. "For if any one booke of Scripture did give testimonie to
all, yet that Scripture which giveth credite to the rest would
require another Scripture to give credite unto it: neither could we
ever have any pause whereon to rest our assurance this way; so that
unlesse besides Scripture there were something which might assure us
that we do well, we could not thinke we do well, no not in being
assured that scripture is a sacred and holie rule of well doing."
(II.4.2; 1:153.18 25).
71. In Book III of the Lawes Hooker wrote of the
Christian first accepting Scripture as God's Word relying upon the
Church's authority in declaring it to be God's Word. In time, as we
are nurtured by the Church's liturgical routine, "we find that the
thing it selfe doth answer our received opinion concerning it."
(III.8.14).
72. "In the number of principles one is the sacred authoritie
of scripture. Being therefore perswaded by other meanes that these
scriptures are the oracles of God, them selves do then teach us the
rest, and laye before us all the duties which God requireth at our
hands as necessary unto salvation." (I.14.1; 1:126.9 13).
73. III.8.16; 1:233.20.
74. I.14.2; 1:126.10 24.
75. Compare Hooker's notion of "collection" with Article VI
of The Thirty Nine Articles: "so that whatsoever is not read
therein, nor may be proved thereby, is not to be required of any
man, that it should be believed as an article of the faith, or be
thought requisite or necessary to salvation."
76. The authority of reason which Hooker places alongside
with revelation is not the general capacity for thinking present in
all men, who "are of God." (Pref. 3.10) By contrast, those who are
not redeemed by grace possess only a perverted reason that cannot
function properly.
77. III.10.2; 1:240.31 241.26.
78. III.10.3; 1:242.16 243.6.
79. Hence, when Hooker attacked the Puritan insistence that
the apostolic age provides a permanent authoritative norm for church
policy, he employs the principle that a "difference of times,
places, persons, and other the like circumstances" on occasion
requires the alteration of particularities of "the Lawes of
Christ" as they were described in the New Testament. III.11.13;
1:261.7 11.
80. William P. Haugaard, The Scriptural Hermeneutic of
Richard Hooker, subtitle for article, p. 161f.
81. II.8.5; 1:189.10 11. Cf. I.14.1; 1:124.27 28.
82. While much has been made of Hooker's reliance on
Thomistic thought in his discussion of laws and of Scriptural
interpretation, it should be recognized, however, that Calvin
developed a similar hermeneutic for determining the moral relevance
of Old Testament laws. See Calvin's discussion of the Decalogue in
InstitutesII.8.8f. 83. II.6.1; 1:168.3 5.
84. "The severall bookes of scripture having had some
severall occasions and particular purpose which caused them to be
written, the contents thereof are according to the exigence of that
speciall ende whereunto they are intended. Hereupon it growth that
everie booke of holie scripture doth take out all kinds of truth,
naturall, historical, forreine, supernaturall, so much as the matter
handled requireth." (I.14.3; 1:127.21 26)
85. II.7.5; 1:180.25 26.
86. I.12, 15; 1:119.26 122.5; 130.7 134.18.
87. "Unlike many modern biblical critics, Hooker could write
that the scriptural texts literally contained 'manifest testimony
cited from the mouth of God himself'; yet, at the same time,
foreshadowing the work of such critics, his exegesis took account of
human limitations inherent in many ways of those texts." William
Haugaard, The Scriptural Hermeneutics of Richard Hooker, p.
169 70.
88. "Although the scripture of God...be stored with infinite
varietie of matter in al kinds, although it abound with all sorts of
lawes, yet the principal intent of scripture is to deliver the lawes
of duties supernaturall." (1.14.1; 1:124.29 32) Again, "The laws of
reason doth somewhat direct men how to honour God in such sort as
their Creator, but how to glorifie God...to the end that he my be an
everlasting Savior, this we are taught by divine law [scripture]."
(I.16.5; 1:139.3 7) And elsewhere, "The ende of the word of God is
to save, and therefore we term it the word of life. The waie for all
men to be saved is by the knowledg of that truth which the worde
hath taught." (V.21.3; 2:84.24 26)
89. Theologians generally agreed that fundamental Jewish
moral laws continued in force for Christians, whereas ceremonial
laws are abrogated; they did not always agree on the force of Old
Testament judicial (criminal) laws. Hooker consistently interprets
the force of such laws in the light of their purpose and historical
situation. The judicial laws provide key test cases for identifying
issues of Biblical omnicompetence. A law ought to be maintained only
if "the ende for which it was made and...the aptnes of thinges
therein prescribed unto the same end" continued in the present
historical circumstances. (III.10.1; 1:239.32 240,2. Cf. I.11.3;
1:113.9).
Hooker's interrelated analyses of "ende" and "aptnes" provided him
with a flexibility that freed his exegesis from a literal Biblicism
that often marked English Protestant writing in his day. For
example, he explained the severity of God's order to execute a man
gathering sticks on the Sabbath; the severity was "perhaps the more
requisite at that instant both because the Jews by reason of theire
longe aboad in a place of continuall servile toile could not
suddainely be wained and drawn unto contrarie offices without some
strong impression of terror, and also...there is nothing more
needful than to punish with extremitie the first transgressions of
those lawes that require a more exact observation for manie ages to
come." (V.71.8; 2:380.10 6; see also III.11.8; 1:252.20 26).
This penalty for Sabbath breaking in the Book of Numbers was
appropriately "apt" in its day, but the same "ende," namely "rest
from labor wherewith publiquelie God is served," is better promoted
in later ages by recognizing "occasions" when people may "with verie
good conscience" be drawn "from the ordinarie rule." (V.56.6;
2:380.1 3).
90. JS Marshall, Hooker and Anglican Tradition: An
Historical and Theological Study of Hooker's Ecclesiastical Polity
(London, 1963), p122: "Hooker's is an Incarnational theology." Cited
by Bruce Kaye, "Authority and the Interpretation of Scripture," JRH
21:1 Feb 1997, p. 96 98.
91. One can see the central place which Christology has for
Hooker in his discussion of the sacraments in Book V.50 57. In Book
V, Hooker is dealing with the criticism of the Puritans that there
is a great deal of superstition retained in the various public
duties of the Christian religion as they are practiced in the Church
of England. After preliminary discussion he deals with the question
of places of public service, of public teaching, or preaching and of
prayer. Then he comes to the question of the sacraments. Before
discussing the sacraments and their necessity, Hooker provides an
extended discussion of Christology in order to demonstrate that God
is in Christ by the personal Incarnation of the Son who is Himself
very God. The logic is entirely consistent with the framework which
has been set out in the first two books: "The use of sacraments is
but only in life, yeat so that here they converne a farre better
life then this, and are for that cause accompanied wit grace which
worketh salvation., Sacraments are the powerfull instruments of God
to eternall life. For as our naturall life consisteth in the union
of the bodie wit the soule; so our life supernaturall in the union
of the soule with God. And for as much as there is no union of God
with man without that meane betweene both which is both, it seemeth
requisite that wee first consider how God is in Christ, then how
Christ is in us, and how the sacraments doe serve to make us
pertakers of Christ. In other thinges wee may be more brief, but the
waight of these requireth largeness." (V.50.3).
92. "Precisely because Scripture has Christocentric shape, it
is of essential importance that in interpreting individual passages
the over arching design be carefully kept in mind."92 (Egil Grislis,
"The Hermeneutical Problem in Hooker", p. 192) Thus Hooker
interpreted Scriptures in terms of what David Tracy has called
"focal meaning": "he event/gift/grace of Jesus Christ" and qualified
the verbal inspiration of Scripture. (187)
93. V.21.3; 2:84.23 4.
94. I.11.6; 1:118.31 32.
95. The mayne drifte of the whole newe Testament is that
which Saint John setteth downe as the purpose of his owne historie,
These things are written, that ye might believe that Jesus is Christ
the Sonne of God, and that in believing yee might have life through
his name. The drift of the old that which the Apostle mentioneth to
Timothie, The holie Scriptures are able to make thee wise unto
salvation. So that the generall end both of the olde and newe is
one, the difference between them consisting in this, that the old
did make wise by teaching salvation through Jesus Christ that should
come, the newe by teaching that Christ the Saviour is come, and that
Jesus whome the Jewes did crucifie, and whome God did rayse again
from the dead is he. (I.14.4; 1:128.4 14)
96. "We teach that whatsoever is unto salvation termed
necessarie by way of excellencie, whatsoever it standeth al men upon
to knowe or doe that they may be saved...of which sort the articles
of Christian faith, and the sacraments of the Church of Christ are,
all such thinges if scripture did not comprehende, the Church of God
should not be able to measure out the length and the breadth of that
waye wherein for ever she is to walke, Heretiques and Schismatiques
never ceasing some to abridge, some to enlarge, all to pervert and
obscure the same. But as for those things that are accessorie
hereunto, those thinges that so belong to the way of salvation, as
to alter them is no otherwise to change that way, then a path is
changed by altering onely the uppermost face thereof...we holde not
the Church further tyed herein unto scripture, then that against
scripture nothing to be admitted in the Church." (III.3.3;
1:211.2 21)
97. These matters are to be distinguished from "thinges
arbitrarie" (I.10.5; 1:100.16 19).
98. V.65.2, 11; 2:302.7 8, 311.22. The category of "the
indifferent," referring to matters in between the required and
prohibited, was recognized by Thomas Aquinas in his scriptural
commentaries and entered the logic of the Reformation, as early as
Luther and Melancthon. It was used by Calvin and was well developed
to support various positions within the English Reformation. But
Hooker generally uses the concept of adiaphora in a way different to
Calvin's, however. Whereas Calvin employs it in order either to
allow Christian liberty or to avoid certain practices, lest
consciences be ensnared (Institutes III.19.10. See also
III.19.11). Hooker uses "indifference" for the notion that
Christians can observe such practices freely, or rather, so that the
church can require them freely.
Furthermore, when Hooker argues that "matters indifferent" may be
regulated by the church, he speaks primarily of ceremonies, with no
emphasis on the question of consciences. Calvin, by contrast, argues
that "matters indifferent" must remain indifferent, that is, should
not be regulated by the church, but he is not talking primarily
about ceremonies. (Institutes III.19.9. Calvin does later
recognize that the church may regulate and enforce the determination
of ceremonies otherwise indifferent. See Institutes IV.10.30,
17.43) For Hooker, Puritan arguments that whatever is not commanded
in Scripture is sin would include all indifferent matters (Lawes
II.4.3; 1:154.1 5) and thus forbid those things which are considered
"expedient" in Scripture, the expedient being a part of the group of
things indifferent. (Lawes II.4.4; 1:155.2 4). See William
Neelands, Scripture, Reason, and Tradition, 92.
99. Neelands, Scripture, Reason, and Tradition, 92.
100. Lawes II.4.3; 1:154.1 5. Cf. II.4.4; 1:155.2 4.
101. Article XIX of The Thirty nine Articles of Religion
affirms the Lutheran and Reformed teaching of that the two marks
that identify the presence of the true church on earth are the true
preaching of the Word and the right administration of the
sacraments. Calvin stopped short of declaring discipline or polity a
mark essential to the very essence of the church.
102. V.57.11 13.
103. See Bruce Kaye, "Authority and the Interpretation of
Scripture in Hooker's Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity," in JRH,
21:1 Feb 1997, p. 104 5.
104. "The redeeming presence of God in Jesus Christ, dwelling
within the church, assures Christians that reason and revelation
have not lost their power and will inform as well as transform the
seeker." Egil Grislis, "The Hermeneutical Problem in Richard
Hooker," p. 198.
105. Egil Grislis draws particular attention to the role of
consensus gentium has in Hooker's theological method. See Egil
Grislis, "The Role of Consensus in Richard Hooker's Method of
Theological Enquiry" and "The Hermeneutical Problem in Richard
Hooker." Egil Grislis has emphasized Hooker's concern for
consensus gentium in doctrine.
106. I.8.3; 1:84.1 2.
107. II.8.6; 1:190.23.
108. II.7.2.
109. Wisdom in the truest sense of the word is proclaimed not
by individuals but by whole nations living through the centuries.
This is the best available vantage point from which to obtain the
highest measure of truth: "The generall and perpetuall voice of men
is the sentence of God himself. For that which men have at all times
learned, nature herself must needs have taught; and God being the
author of nature, her voyce is but her instrument." (I.8.3;
1:84.1 4) And again, "That which all men's experience teacheth them
may not in any wise be denied." (III.8.14; 1:231.19 20)
110. II.7.1.
111. It should be pointed out that Hooker's locating
Scriptural interpretation in the church does not overthrow his
advocacy for public discourse, for in Hooker's day, the church and
state of England were coterminous.
112. V.8.2.
113. Here I am indebted to John Booty, who in "Richard Hooker
and the Holy Scriptures" (SEAD Occasional Paper No. 3: Center
Sandwich, New Hampshire May, 1995) calls attention to Hooker's view
of the corporate and doxological use of Scripture.
www.seadinternational.com/occasional_papers/booty.htm
114. V.19.5.
115. Barton and Halliburton, Believing in the Church: The
Corporate Nature of Faith (SPCK: 1981), p. 79 107.
116. "There simply is no theological method, however correct,
that can itself ensure its own infallibility. Even when the best
method is most judiciously employed, it yields, at the very best,
only the highest probability that can be humanly achieved and is
never beyond further debate." Egil Grislis, "The Hermeneutical
Problem in Richard Hooker," p. 179.
117. V.8.2; 2:39.8 9.
118. "We miss Hooker's meaning if we understand reason in a
post Cartesian fashion, construing it as the faculty for precise
logical demonstration. Instead this product of humanist rhetorical
training is pointing to a discursive trait which permits human
beings to reach a consensus which can provide sufficient assurance
for the business of living." Don H. Compier, "Hooker on the
Authority of Scripture in Matters of Morality," p. 258.,
119. Books VI VIII argue strongly against this notion.
120. See Egil Grislis, "The Role of Consensus in Richard
Hooker's Method of Theological Enquiry," in The Heritage of
Christian Thought, ed. Cushman and Grislis (Harper & Row, 1965),
and Peter Munz, The Place of Richard Hooker in the History of
Thought (Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd.: London, 1952)
W Terry Miller
December 16, 2004
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